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Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC: Limiting the Liability 
of Foreign Corporations by Curbing the 
Breadth of the Alien Tort Statute 
SUDIPTA DAS*© 
INTRODUCTION 
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (“Jesner”),1 the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
law of nations imposes liability upon corporate entities for human rights violations 
committed by their employees and, more specifically, whether foreign corporations 
may be defendants in lawsuits brought in under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).2  The 
Supreme Court held that without further action or legislation from Congress, courts 
may not extend ATS liability to foreign corporations, thus barring corporations from 
being defendants in ATS suits.3  The Court wrongly held that foreign corporations 
may not be brought in as defendants in lawsuits under the ATS, as this may enable 
many potential defendant corporations to engage in human rights violations 
without redress.  However, the Court was proper in holding that Congress must 
speak on the ATS and specifically elucidate the extent to which ATS liability may 
apply to foreign corporations with designated limitations.4 
I. THE CASE 
Petitioners in this case consist of both foreign persons who were injured, captured, 
or killed by terrorists overseas, or family members and representatives of the 
estates of those who were subject to those harms.5  Petitioners brought suit against 
Arab Bank, PLC (“Arab Bank”) for allegedly financing the terrorist organizations 
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  1. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 1394. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1407–08. 
 5. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom Jesner v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
  Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
382 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
responsible for petitioners’ grievances.6  Specifically, petitioners assert that Arab 
Bank was heavily involved in the terrorist scheme because it had financed terrorist 
attacks7 in three ways: first, by maintaining “accounts that the terrorist 
organizations used to solicit funds directly”;8 second, by maintaining “accounts that 
proxy organizations and individuals used to raise funds for the terrorist 
organizations”;9 and third, by playing “an active role in identifying the family of 
‘martyrs’10 and facilitating payments to them … on behalf of the terrorist 
organizations.”11   
In court, petitioners brought their claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act12 (“ATA”), 
and the ATS.13  The District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that 
petitioners could not bring claims against foreign corporations under the ATS as per 
the decision given by the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 
(“Kiobel I”),14 which held that the ATS does not hold corporations liable.15  The 
district court reasoned a “decision by a panel of the Second Circuit ‘is binding unless 
and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or by the Supreme Court.’”16  Kiobel I 
was in fact heard by the Supreme Court (“Kiobel II”),17 however, the Supreme Court 
left the question of corporate liability under the ATS unanswered.18  On appeal to 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, petitioners in this case argued that the 
facts of their allegations sufficiently “touch and concern” United States territories19 
in a non-attenuated way to support jurisdiction.  Additionally, petitioners suggested 
 
 6. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 147. 
 7. Petitioners cite several groups that were funded by Arab Bank, including: “Islamic Resistance 
Movement (“Hamas”), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (“AAMB”), and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”). Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Suicide bombers hired by these terrorist groups, whose families were paid after they detonated the 
bombs. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). This statute provides that any “national of the United States injured in his or her 
person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors or 
heirs, may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States.” Id. 
 13. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 147 (explaining that the ATS differs from the ATA in that the former 
provides jurisdiction “only with respect to suits by ‘aliens,’” while the latter provides jurisdiction only for suits 
by United States nationals. Many of the petitioners in this case are foreign nationals). 
 14. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d 569 U.S. 108, 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013).   
 15. Id.  at 148–49. 
 16. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 148 (quoting Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 17. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 18. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1395 (2018). 
 19. The New York branch of Arab Bank allegedly participated in CHIPS transactions to hold money & 
transfer funds while proxy charities (actually terrorist fronts) in Texas used an account with Arab Bank to 
transfer funds to other proxy charities in foreign nations. Id. at 1406, 1435. 
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that since Kiobel II20 did not speak on whether or not corporations are covered by 
the ATS, it actually implied that the ATS may allow for corporate liability.21 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision based on Kiobel I and 
stated that the Court’s former ruling not to include corporate liability should be 
upheld.22  However, the Court did acknowledge a circuit split23 and noted that there 
was a “growing consensus” among the sister circuits to hold that the ATS should 
extend liability to incorporated entities.24  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address whether a corporation can be subject to liability and suit under 
the ATS.25 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In the United States, claims are rarely brought under the Alien Tort Statute; in fact, 
many of the initial cases interpreting the statute came nearly a hundred or more 
years after it was written.26  However, when the ATS has been used, it has provided 
redress for many egregious human rights violations committed by various 
defendants.  Section II.A reviews the statute itself and several of the early cases 
delineating the limits of the ATS.  Section II.B. reviews the case, Kiobel II, which 
brought the issue of whether corporations fall under the scope of the ATS’s 
jurisdiction to the attention of the Supreme Court. 
A.  Prominent Cases Discussing the ATS 
Originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,27 the ATS reads: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”28 
While the text of the statute itself is quite succinct, the statute has had great 
influence—in fact, foreign citizens have used the ATS to gain relief since the 1980s.29  
Plaintiffs have used the statute to obtain remedies in U.S. courts for human-rights 
violations that have occurred outside of the U.S., but are still related to the U.S. in 
 
 20. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 21. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 148. 
 22. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1396. 
 23. Decisions in the Courts of Appeal for the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits agree that 
foreign corporations can be subject to suit under the ATS. Id. at 1396. 
 24. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 151. 
 25. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395. 
 26. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) discussed below, brought the ATS into issue in 1980. 
The ATS was written in 1789. 
 27. This act created the federal district courts & delineated what their jurisdictions covered. Jesner, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1396–97. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). 
 29. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (this was the first case to actively examine the ATS). 
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some manner.30  The first case to actively employ the ATS in this sense was Filartiga 
v. Pena-Irala.31  Decided in 198032 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, Filartiga “paved the way for a new conceptualization of the ATS.”33  The 
appellants in that case were two Paraguayan citizens who had lodged a case against 
another Paraguayan citizen who was living in the United States.34  The appellee, a 
former police chief in Paraguay, had allegedly caused the death of appellants’ family 
member by torturing him for his political beliefs against Paraguay’s leadership.35  
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York had dismissed the action for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the appellants appealed the action citing the 
law of nations, which prohibited egregious acts such as official torture and did not 
distinguish aliens from citizens.36 
The appellants argued that they could use the ATS as a vehicle by which to bring 
their claims, since it explicitly states that the district courts “shall have original 
jurisdiction,” for an act that is “committed in violation of the law of nations.”37  They 
then argued that official torture would surely fit under this provision, and the court 
agreed.38  The court found “that an act of torture committed by a state official 
against one held in detention violates established norms of the international law of 
human rights, and hence [also violates] the law of nations.”39  As an act of torture 
is covered by the law of nations, then such an act is also covered by United States 
federal courts; and thus, since the law of nations falls within the federal common 
law, the ATS must also come within the purview of federal-question jurisdiction.40 
The appellee conceded that official torture may be covered by the ATS, but 
sought dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.41  The Court struck this 
argument down, noting that “[common] law courts of general jurisdiction regularly 
adjudicate transitory tort claims between individuals over whom they exercise 
personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.”42  Thus, although none of the 
parties in Filartiga was a citizen of the United States, whenever an alleged torturer 
was found and served with process by an alien within the borders of the United 
 
 30. Id. at 877–78 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 31. See generally id. 
 32. This case was decided nearly one hundred and seventy years after the ATS was originally written. 
 33. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 610 (2004). 
 34. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 880. 
 37. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). 
 38. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. 
 39. Id. at 880. 
 40. Id. at 885. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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States (satisfying personal jurisdiction requirements), they may be brought in.  This 
idea is also supported by the language in the first Judiciary Act,43 which denotes that 
federal jurisdiction may preside over aliens for suits where principles of 
international law are in issue.44 
Over twenty years later, the ATS was again brought into issue in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,45 the first Supreme Court case to speak on the ATS.  In this case, plaintiff 
Alvarez brought a claim under the ATS against Sosa for arbitrary arrest and 
detention, after he was abducted by Sosa prior to being arrested.46  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Alvarez’s arrest was arbitrary due to his 
abduction and thus, violated international law and could be brought in under the 
ATS like the official torture claim in Filartiga.47 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, clarifying that 
the ATS itself cannot be used to create a cause of action.48  Instead, the Court 
clarified that the ATS can only be used as a method of bringing in claims by setting 
jurisdiction “for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of 
nations.”49  Here, Alvarez’s claim would not fit within the purview of accepted 
actions—although he was abducted and subsequently arrested, his arrest lasted for 
less than twenty-four hours and did not subject him to any outrageous amount of 
discomfort;50 in fact, he was later transferred into the custody of proper 
authorities.51  Ultimately, Alvarez’s short stint in jail did not fall under what could 
be considered a violation of the law of nations. 
The Court defined the acts that do violate the law of nations  as actions that “rest 
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the 
Court has] recognized.”52  This sentence would become a two-part test created by 
Sosa to be used in ATS cases: the first prong asking whether the claim relates to a 
norm that has been violated and is a norm universally recognized by the civilized 
world;53 and the second prong asking courts to decide whether the claim is so 
 
 43. §9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
 44. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. 
 45. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See also id. at 733 n.20 (“A related consideration is 
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being 
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”). 
 46. Id. at 697–99. 
 47. Id. at 699.   
 48. Id. at 720. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 738. 
 51. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). 
 52. Id. at 725; see also generally Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort 
Statute, and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–33 (2007). 
 53. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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specific as to be comparable enough with violations of international law in place at 
the time the ATS was effected.54  Naturally, the Court explained that the ATS’s scope 
would be expanded outside of violations recognized only in the eighteenth century, 
but the Court also made clear that only truly horrendous human rights violations 
that are internationally recognized should be the claims for which the ATS is used.55  
Thus, Alvarez’s claim did not pass the first prong of the Sosa test because his few 
hours in detention could not be considered a horrendous violation of any 
internationally-recognized norm.56  Crimes that are exemplary of violating such 
norms would include torture (as in Filartiga), “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment … genocide … war crimes … crimes against humanity … summary 
execution … prolonged arbitrary detention … [and] forced disappearance.”57 
While these crimes are archetypal of what can be brought under an ATS claim, 
the actual requirements are still quite vague.  In Doe v. Qi58 the Court held that even 
though the specific limits of each crime may make the applicability of the ATS 
unclear,59 the ATS will be applicable in “clear cases.”60 
Undoubtedly, the use of the ATS in these cases has created controversy, and 
although Congress has yet to speak on the matter, many Courts and scholars alike 
have suggested that Congress do away with the statute.61  The crux of the problem 
appears to be that many disfavor the United States’ involvement in human rights 
violations that have been occurring outside of the country—that it is a form of 
judicial overreach to allow the exercise of legal jurisdiction in the United States for 
violations that have occurred in foreign countries, especially when the United States 
has otherwise good relations with those countries.62  A circuit split had formed over 
this issue, especially in the realm of whether corporations could be held liable under 
the ATS just as individual persons could be held liable.63  That question was initially 
posed in Kiobel I.64 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 725. 
 56. Id. at 727. 
 57. Stephens, supra note 52 at 5, 7. 
 58. Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 59. Sosa is exemplary of this, where the plaintiff was clearly arbitrarily arrested and detained illegally, but 
despite the act being wrong in and of itself, the fact that his arrest was not that long and did not cause suffering 
voided his use of the ATS. 
 60. Additionally, there are differing levels of invasions of bodily integrity that are to be considered cruel 
and not cruel—choking a plaintiff being detained for one day was not considered cruel by the Human Rights 
Committee, but sexual assault of a plaintiff was considered cruel by both the Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court of Human Rights. Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1322, 1323–24 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 61. Bradley Curtis, Judicial Foreign Policy We Cannot Afford, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/AR2009041702859.html. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See supra footnote 23 and accompanying text. 
 64. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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B.   Answering the Un-Answered Question in Kiobel II 
Kiobel I was decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010.  In that case, 
the court limited the breadth of ATS’s jurisdictional reach, stating that “customary 
international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for 
international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable 
for a violation of the laws of nations.”65  Thus, any plaintiffs’ claims against a 
corporation are likely to fall outside of the narrow purview of the ATS’s 
jurisdiction.66 
However, the statute itself does not have any mention of who falls within its 
jurisdiction except for the words “action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the laws of nations.”67  There is no real clarity as to whether the phrase 
“an alien” refers to individuals alone or to both individuals and corporate entities.68  
The statute is also unclear as to who is committing the violation—the language is 
passive and does not identify whether actionable crimes can be committed only by 
either individual persons or again, by a corporate entity.  As for the court’s holding 
in Kiobel I, while the Second Circuit stated that corporations could not be brought 
in under the ATS, other circuits ruled on the side that corporations could and should 
be brought in and held liable under the statute, including the Seventh Circuit,69 the 
Ninth Circuit,70 and the D.C. Circuit.71 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Kiobel II 2013; however, the question 
of whether the ATS could be used in lawsuits against foreign corporations was left 
unresolved, and the Second Circuit’s holding has been subsequently acknowledged 
as proper by the Supreme Court in Jesner.72  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Jesner simultaneously answered this previously unanswered question in Kiobel I, 
where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the ATS did not extend 
to suits against corporations.73  Kiobel I’s holding is now binding precedent, and 
foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. 
 
 65. Kiobel, 621, F.3d at 120.   
 66. Id. 
 67. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). 
 68. See generally Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to 
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (discussing whether or not a corporation 
is to be considered a “person,” or if this is a legal fiction that holds no merit; often corporations are treated as 
a person in that they have certain relationships with the government and court system because they can sue 
and be sued). 
 69. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 70. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–45, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 71. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. No. 09-7125 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 72. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1396, 1398, 1403, 1408 (2018). 
 73. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 210 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Jesner, the Supreme Court wrongly determined that the ATS does not impose 
liability on corporations for human rights violations committed by its employees.  
Section III.A will discuss Justice Kennedy’s Opinion written for the majority, which 
focused on narrowing the liability the ATS could impose upon corporations.  That 
Section will also examine the irony of the majority’s opinion in stating that Congress 
should clarify the meaning of certain terms within the ATS, while simultaneously 
engaging in judicial overreach by defining those same terms.  Section III.B will 
examine Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan.  Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion considered the long-standing 
negative effects the majority’s decision will have, and rightly supports a broader 
understanding of the ATS’s words, “an alien.”74  The Dissenting opinion rightfully 
would have left the ATS open to interpretation, until the legislative branch decides 
it truly wants to bar “corporations” from the definition of “an alien.” 
A.  The ATS’s Scope has Become Overly-Narrowed, Allowing for Corporations 
to Reign Supreme Over Transnational Human Rights – Justice Kennedy’s 
Majority Opinion 
With Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court held that foreign 
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS.75  The Court 
reasoned primarily that the issue revolves around the of separation of powers, and 
that it would be better placed upon Congress to determine the bounds of ATS 
liability.76 
Justice Kennedy first walked through the Court’s analysis in Kiobel II77 and 
acknowledged that the Court had left the question of corporate liability under the 
ATS unanswered when it decided that case.78  Judge Cabranes, who wrote the 
majority opinion in Kiobel I, held that the ATS does not apply to alleged 
international-law violations by a corporation.79  Justice Kennedy noted Kiobel’s II’s 
requirement that “where the [petitioners’] claims touch and concern the territory 
of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”80  In other words, the connection 
to the United States in the allegations presented must be enough so the case is not 
dismissed.   
 
 74. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). 
 75. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403. 
 76. Id. at 1402. 
 77. The Opinion in this case was written by Chief justice Roberts. 
 78. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395. 
 79. Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 80. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398. 
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As for the instant case, the majority noted that most of petitioners’ allegations 
involve conduct that had occurred largely in the Middle East.81  The majority did, 
however, acknowledge petitioners’ allegations that Arab Bank had used its New 
York branch to clear transactions related to the purported terrorist acts and to 
launder money for certain Hamas-affiliated organizations located in Texas.82  
Despite these U.S.-based activities, the Court believed that the alleged activities of 
the defendant corporation and its employees had “insufficient connections to the 
United States to subject it to jurisdiction under the ATS.”83  However, even if these 
aforementioned connections were to reach “sufficiency,” Justice Kennedy wrote 
that it was still appropriate to deny petitioners’ ATS claim, emphasizing that 
international relations would be strained if the ATS was used in this manner.84 
The Supreme Court decided to maintain Judge Cabranes’ holding in Kiobel I, 
essentially to avoid any foreign-relations issues with other countries.  Justice 
Kennedy noted that Congress’s main purpose in drafting the ATS was to “avoid 
foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum where the 
failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the United States 
responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.”85  First, the Court studied the charters 
of various international criminal tribunals, noting that such tribunals “often exclude 
corporations from their jurisdictional reach,”86 and are usually limited to “natural 
persons.”87  Justice Kennedy reasoned that these charters provide against a broad 
holding of corporate liability under the Court’s understanding of the ATS.88  The 
Court did assert that “corporations should be subject to liability for the crimes of 
their human agents,”89 but since the “international community has not yet taken 
that step,” it would be averse for the Court to take such a leap forward.90 
Justice Kennedy further corroborated the importance of foreign relations by 
noting that there are global consequences to claims brought under the ATS.91  For 
example, the instant case has purportedly strained relations with Jordan,92 as both 
Jordan and Arab Bank are considered “counterterrorism partners” to the United 
 
 81. Id. at 1394. 
 82. Id. at 1394–95. The majority claimed these transactions (called “CHIP transactions”) are so numerous 
and used widely between U.S. and foreign banks, that supervision of all these sorts of transactions is not 
practicable. Id. at 1395. 
 83. Id. at 1398. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1397. 
 86. 86. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1400–01. 
 89. Id. at 1402. 
 90. Id. at 1402.   
 91. Id. at 1406–07. 
 92. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406–07 (2018). 
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States.93  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy warned of a possible slippery slope: if the 
Supreme Court decided to hold foreign corporations liable under the ATS, it would 
be a “precedent-setting principle” that would enable various other nations to pull 
American corporations into “their courts for alleged violations of the law of 
nations.”94  Thus, in light of these diplomatic disruptions, the Court believes it apt 
to leave it to Congress’s discretion to determine the breadth of ATS liability.  Justice 
Kennedy clarified that even if the petitioners’ claims had a sufficient connection to 
U.S. activity and there was no foreign relations issue, allowing an ATS claim in this 
case would be problematic because the ATS has been explicitly noted to just cover 
“an alien,” and not “corporations.”95 
According to the Court, it is the job of Congress to further expand the definition 
of “an alien” within the ATS to include corporations if they so choose, as they are 
the political branch the Court believes is best able to handle the question.96  
However, as of the Jesner decision, the Court foreclosed this Congressional 
opportunity by limiting the scope of ATS liability to exclude corporations 
completely, and by holding that “foreign corporations may not be defendants in 
suits brought under the ATS.”97 
Despite suggesting that Congress did not intend for ATS liability to encompass 
foreign corporations, the Court hypothesized several ways by which Congress could 
incorporate foreign corporations into the ATS’s jurisdiction.98  Justice Kennedy 
posited a situation where Congress could allow foreign corporations to be subject 
to ATS liability as long as “some limitations or preconditions” were in place.99  He 
suggested that corporate liability be limited to “cases where a corporation’s 
management was actively complicit in the crime,” or where members of the board 
of directors or other officers were acting criminally on behalf of the corporation 
itself.100  The Court then reiterated that these proposed theories are better left to 
the purview of Congress.101 
Lastly, as a minimal consolation to petitioners, the Court suggested other vague 
alternative routes to bring in petitioners’ case against Arab Bank aside from use of 
 
 93. Id. at 1406. 
 94. Id. at 1405. 
 95. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). 
 96. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 97. Id. Ironically, immediately after stating this holding Justice Kennedy pivots back to it being a decision 
for Congress, stating that with “the ATS, the First Congress provided a federal remedy for a narrow-category of 
international-law violations committed by individuals. Whether, more than two centuries on, a similar remedy 
should be available against foreign corporations is similarly a decision that Congress must make.” Id. 
 98. Id. at 1407–08. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1408. 
 101. Id. 
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the ATS.102  The Court suggested that petitioners could individually sue the Arab 
Bank employees who were potentially responsible for violating any international 
laws under the ATS.103  Justice Kennedy also discussed the option of suing individual 
employees by using the Torture Victim Protection Act104 of 1991 (“TVPA”), a 
“codified note following the ATS”105 which is the only cause of action under the ATS 
created by Congress rather than the Courts.106  A “key feature of TVPA” is that it 
limits liability to “individuals,” thereby failing to reach corporations.107  The Court 
used this feature to further support the idea that Congress would likely not have 
wanted ATS liability to cover corporations instead of just natural persons.108  The 
majority concluded their opinion by noting that it is again up to Congress and not 
judicial deference to decide if corporate liability is to be given under the ATS, and if 
it is, what limitations are to be set upon it.109 
B.   The ATS Had Potential to Bar Foreign Corporations from Engaging in 
Egregious Human Rights Violations – Justice Sotomayor’s Dissenting 
Opinion 
According to Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, the majority’s decision will have 
lasting effects, because it “absolves corporations from responsibility under the ATS 
for conscience-shocking behavior.”110  Sotomayor’s concern is justified, as 
immunizing corporations from the liability that the ATS provides can be detrimental 
because it “allows these [corporate] entities to take advantage of the significant 
benefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights111 … without having to 
shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities.”112  In other words, these 
corporations may be enabled to abuse their rights without any worry of 
proscription. 
Sotomayor’s dissent initially runs through the history and purpose of the ATS.  
Pursuant to the first prong of the two-part Sosa test, the ATS permits federal courts 
to recognize private causes of action for certain torts that violate the established 
 
 102. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405 (2018). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991). This was originally a 
note following 28 U.S.C. §1350, that later became a codified note and its own act. 
 105. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398. 
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 107. Id. at 1404. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1408. 
 110. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 111. See also generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014). 
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law of nations, “without the need for any ‘further congressional action.’”113  Courts 
undertaking ATS claims must first analyze the international law norm that has 
allegedly been violated and determine whether it falls under the category specified 
in Sosa114 (specific, universal, obligatory and internationally recognized human 
rights violations recognized from the eighteenth century onwards).115  Sotomayor 
clarified Sosa’s holding, stating that the term “norm,” as used in these cases, means 
substantive conduct, not just an already accepted act within the prohibited 
categories of the laws of nations.116  In other words, the acts should not be limited 
to what has already been deemed as a prohibited violation of a recognized norm.117 
The dissent addressed the majority’s analysis of Sosa’s footnote twenty, which 
contemplated whether or not international law extends liability for norm violations 
to corporations, who are private actors.118  Justice Sotomayor conducted a statutory 
interpretation of the thirty-three-word ATS, noting that the statute’s phrase, 
“committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,”119 
requires only that the alleged violation be conduct that is condemned as under 
international law standards.120  The relevant test is centered on a “norm-specific 
inquiry, not a categorical one”;121 thus, the focus is whether act of financing 
terrorism is sufficiently “specific, universal, and obligatory,” such that it passes the 
rigor of Sosa’s first step.122  The focus would not be categorical, meaning it would 
not center on whether private entities such as corporations may or may not commit 
such a prohibited violation of said norm.123 
Justice Sotomayor’s analysis critiques the majority’s limited reading of Sosa 
footnote twenty,124 where the Court created a distinction between how 
international law will treat corporations and natural persons.125  The dissent noted 
 
 113. Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724, 712) (emphasis added). 
 114. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 115. See supra Part II.B, and notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 116. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420, (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See supra footnote 43 and accompanying text. 
 119. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). (emphasis added). 
 120. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1421. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 1422. 
 122. Id. 
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obligatory norm of corporate liability under international law, the relevant inquiry in response to the question 
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… international law provides no such reason … [nor] does domestic law.”). 
 124. See supra notes 43, 91 and accompanying text. 
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that the majority’s argument is faulty, as it is insufficient to prove that international 
law “distinguishes between corporations and natural persons as a categorical 
matter.”126  Even if international laws are to treat the two entities entirely 
differently, the ATS’s words itself do not say a corporation cannot be a violator.  As 
such, the focus should be on whether an egregious act was committed, and whether 
such act violated norms considered under the law of nations, regardless of whether 
the norm-violator was a natural person or a corporation.  Justice Sotomayor had 
pointed to various evidentiary pieces demonstrating that corporations do, in fact, 
come under fire in the international law realm, including under Military Tribunals,127 
and International Criminal Tribunals.128 
Importantly, the dissent notes another international body that recognizes 
corporations129—the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism,130 an organization that requires its members to hold corporations 
liable for using and collecting funds, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of 
assisting terrorist acts.  Incidentally, the United States is a party to this 
organization—a fact that, as the dissent noted, the majority failed to point out.131  
Justice Sotomayor described how corporations have long been held liable for their 
wrongdoings through routes other than the ATS—she wrote of several states within 
the U.S. that have imposed “criminal and civil liability on corporations for law-of-
nations violations through their domestic legal systems.”132 
Next, the minority wrote that the text of the statute itself allows for corporate 
liability, as it “confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear”133 civil actions 
for torts, and corporations “have long been held liable in tort under the federal 
common law.”134  Justice Sotomayor noted that while the ATS expressly limited “the 
class of permissible plaintiffs”135 to “alien[s],”136 there is no delineation of what 
 
law, but how a particular actor is held liable for a given law-of-nations violation generally is a question of 
enforcement left up to individual states.” Id. 
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 130. Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 230. 
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“alien” entails or covers in terms of types of defendants.137  The dissent 
acknowledged the majority’s concern with making a decision better suited for 
Congress—namely that Congress should be the body to decide what is included 
under the definition of “alien.”138  However, the dissent argued that Congress’s 
silence here was not inadvertent, and that silence is not demonstrative of the need 
to “limit the range of permissible defendants.”139 
Lastly, Justice Sotomayor concluded her dissent by addressing several other 
concerns raised by the majority, including their fear with regard to the destruction 
of international relations.  On this matter, the minority is quite candid, explaining 
that if “diplomatic strife” is to occur, it may not make much difference whether the 
crime is accountable to the country as a whole, or to a corporation acting on behalf 
of their country.140  As for the majority’s concerns of American corporations being 
dragged into courts for their conduct around the world, the dissent pointed to the 
lack of evidence given by the majority to corroborate these harrowing 
complaints.141 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Jesner,142 the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the ATS to exclude 
corporations, thereby barring corporations from being brought in as defendants 
under ATS suits.143  The Court made an incorrect judgment in this instance because 
the Court erroneously assessed petitioners’ claim as not having sufficient 
connection to the U.S.  While maintaining foreign relations is a valid concern, the 
Court inadequately defended this concern by suggesting that corporations should 
not be held liable under the ATS because of the creation of the TVPA.  The Court’s 
reasoning that the TVPA would be a good substitute for the ATS is flawed because 
the TVPA is an even more narrowly construed method that will likely not provide 
relief to petitioners such as those in the instant case.  Additionally, the Court acted 
in Congress’s stead by closing all interpretation of the ATS before Congress actually 
spoke on the issue.  The plain language of the ATS itself supports the inclusion of 
corporations within its jurisdiction, and Congress’s silence on the matter should not 
be used to exclude all corporate entities from liability.  As stated by Justice 
Sotomayor in her dissent, the “text, history, and purpose of the ATS plainly support 
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the conclusion that corporations may be held liable.”144  The Court’s decision will 
likely have rippling effects, as the ATS can no longer be used as a method to hold 
corporations accountable for egregious acts that they commit. 
A.    The Court Erroneously Concluded that the Petitioners’ Claim was Too 
Tenuous in its Connection to the United States 
The Justices partaking in the majority exalted the position of Arab Bank as a foreign-
relations necessity145 and gave substantially less consideration to the position of the 
petitioners.  The Court dismissed petitioners’ claims as being too attenuated and 
minor in substantive connections to U.S. territories.146  However, petitioners’ claims 
were not revolving around the actual terrorist attacks that had occurred in the 
Middle East, admittedly distant from the U.S.  Instead the petitioners’ claims 
centered on Arab Bank’s financial support of terrorism.147  Petitioners do not assert, 
as respondents allege, that Arab Bank themselves committed the killings abroad.148  
Rather, they assert that these acts were “facilitated by a foreign corporation,” and 
that some of the officials who worked at Arab Bank “allowed the Bank to be used 
to transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, which in turn enabled or 
facilitated criminal acts of terrorism.”149   
The Court is indeed correct in noting that there is a minor connection between 
the actual terrorist attacks and the alleged conduct at issue—but that is exactly the 
flaw in the Court’s reasoning, since the terrorist attacks were not what was brought 
into issue by the petitioners.  What was brought into issue was the assistance Arab 
Bank and its members provided that led to a chain of actions eventually building up 
to those terrorist attacks on petitioners and their families.150  The Court clearly 
stated the grievance in its own terms, having noted that what petitioners actually 
attempted to prove was not that Arab Bank committed the “terrorist attacks at 
issue,”151 but that Arab Bank “helped the terrorists receive the moneys in part by 
means of currency clearances and bank transactions” through electronic 
transfers.152 
It appears that the Court conflated these allegations of improper money 
handling by human agents of Arab Bank with the terrorist attacks in and of 
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themselves, as demonstrated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion which noted that the 
petitioners “allege that they or their family members were injured by terrorist 
attacks in the Middle East over a 10-year period.”153  Almost immediately after this 
sentence, the Court wrote yet again that “[most] of petitioners’ allegations involve 
conduct that occurred in the Middle East”154—a repetitive phrase that seemingly 
detracts from the actual allegations at hand.  To the contrary, the claim at issue 
involved conduct that occurred in the United States, prior to the attacks in the 
Middle East.155 
If the claim, as stated, revolved around Arab Bank’s illicit handling of money, 
then it is difficult to see how petitioners’ allegations were in any matter attenuated.  
Petitioners claimed that Arab Bank used its New York branch to (1) clear “dollar-
denominated transactions” through a Clearing House Interbank Payments System 
(“CHIPS”), and (2) to commit money laundering for a Texas-based charity156 that is 
allegedly affiliated with Hamas.157  Further, petitioners claimed that Arab Bank’s 
New York branch had been helping to transfer funds from the accounts of the Texas 
charity to “bank accounts of terrorist-affiliated charities in the Middle East.”158  
Again, the claim focused not on the actual terrorist attacks, but the illegal financial 
activities that took place in the United States; particularly in New York and Texas.  
The conduct that occurred in the Middle East was facilitated by the happenings in 
New York and Texas. 
The events in Filartiga,159 in comparison, had an even less substantial connection 
to the United States than those in the instant case.  There, the plaintiffs were 
permitted to bring their claims under the ATS even though all of the parties involved 
were Paraguayan citizens.160  The crimes at issue were the torture and murder of 
the plaintiffs’ family member—heinous acts that occurred within the Republic of 
Paraguay.161  The plaintiffs brought their case against the defendant when the 
parties were residing in the U.S.,162 and used the ATS to bring causes of action under 
both tort law (wrongful death statutes) and international laws of human rights.163  
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 154. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018). 
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 159. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 160. Id. at 878. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 878–89. 
 163. Id. The international law claims included claims under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
and others. Id. 
  SUDIPTA DAS 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 397 
Analyzing the claim under step-one of the Sosa analysis, torture is clearly a violation 
of a norm universally recognized by the civilized world.164   
After analysis of the ATS, the court in Filartiga decided that the torture the 
decedent had suffered fell directly within a violation of the law of nations as 
required by the ATS, despite the fact that the heinous act did not occur within the 
United States.165  Federal jurisdiction was allowed in accordance with the ATS, and 
the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim, despite the tenuous substantive connection 
to the United States in that case.166  The only substantive connection to the U.S. was 
the fact that each party was domiciled in the U.S.167  The court in Filartiga assuaged 
other worries with regard to jurisdiction by noting that jurisdiction in the U.S. is 
granted if the case is grounded “upon statutes enacted by Congress or upon the 
common law of the United States.”168  The ATS became a part of U.S. common law 
upon adoption of the Constitution, authorized by Article III of the Constitution.169 
If the upheld precedent of Filartiga were to be decided by today’s Supreme 
Court, it may very well not have passed the absurd rigor of the test of sufficient 
connection to the U.S., if even illegal actions occurring within the U.S. are not 
sufficient enough.  Additionally, a reexamination of the text of the ATS 
demonstrates that there is no need for the alleged tort or violation of the law of 
nations to have occurred within the borders of the U.S.—the only requirement is 
that the alleged act occurred and was violative.170 
B.    The Court was Incorrect in Suggesting that the TVPA Demonstrates that 
the ATS is Not Meant to Include Corporations 
The Court narrows in on Jordan and Arab Bank’s positions as foreign connections 
and “counterterrorism partners” to the U.S., and note that the instant case has put 
a strain upon America’s relationship with the two.171  However, it would be in the 
best interests of both nations as counterterrorism activists to resolve suits to shut 
down corporations that are engaging in terrorist acts, either as a whole or through 
their human agents.172 
 
 164. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 165. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
 166. Id. at 885. 
 167. Id. 885–86. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). Again, the ATS simply reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” Nothing is noted about location within these thirty-three words. Id. 
 171. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406–07 (2018). 
 172. Id. 
  Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
398 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
The Court gave too much deference to the international community when 
deciding the immediate case.  It ironically noted that the American legal system has 
often held corporations liable for the conduct of their “human employees,” but 
stated that corporate entities may not be subject to law of nations violations in the 
same way.173  Instead the Court explained that while corporations should be subject 
to liability if their agents act criminally, the U.S. will not allow liability through the 
ATS, since the international community had not yet done so.174 
However, it is arguable that the international community has already agreed to 
hold corporate entities accountable.  As explained above, the U.S. is a member of 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.175  
The treaty reads:   
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention 
if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should 
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, 
in order to carry out [terrorist acts, and each party to this Convention is 
required] to take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located 
in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person 
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has 
[violated the Convention].176 
In other words, all international members of the Treaty are expected to hold 
corporations liable for using and collecting funds for terrorism.177  The next step is 
to go through the Sosa test and assess whether terrorist financing is a violation of a 
norm universally recognized.  It is true that corporations are legal entities run by 
many individual human agents—the Jesner majority even suggested that 
petitioners go after the individual members of Arab Bank who had caused their 
grievances.178  However, it likely would not be efficient to bring these claims as class 
suits against individual members of the corporation—the named defendants likely 
would not have pockets deep enough to satisfy a judgment against them.  
Additionally, the court suggested that the individual claims be brought under the 
TVPA179 enacted by Congress in 1991.180   
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The Court’s suggestion with regard to individual suits also fails on another level—
the TVPA quite clearly only applies to two certain human rights violations—
”torture” and “extrajudicial killing,”181—neither of which are part of petitioners’ 
actual claims in the instant case.  Petitioners’ claim of financing terrorist 
organizations does not fall within this overly narrow option, which is why 
petitioners had brought in the case under the ATS (which allows suits for all torts in 
violation of the laws of nations brought by foreigners) and the ATA (which allows 
for suits against corporate bodies by foreign nationals).182  In and of itself, the 
existence of these two laws demonstrates that Congress does not expect 
corporations to escape liability.  Thus, the Court’s posited alternatives under which 
petitioners can bring their claims are, at best, circular suggestions.   
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,183 that 
the term “individual,” as referenced in the TVPA includes only individual natural 
persons.184  However, the Mohammad Court conducted a quick comparative 
analysis of the TVPA and ATS, writing that the ATS incidentally “offers no 
comparative value” to the TVPA.185  The Jesner Court then is quick to revert on its 
prior reasoning in Mohammad, and instead state now that the TVPA is not only 
comparable with the ATS, but rather it almost wholly redefines the ATS. 
C.    The Court Overstepped its Bounds as the Judiciary and Enacted a Decision 
Meant for the Legislature, and Congressional Silence Should Not Act as a 
Bar to Interpretations of the ATS 
The Court was correct in stating that Congress should speak on the issue and clarify 
what the term “alien” encapsulates within the meaning of the ATS.  Ironically, 
however, the Court has engaged in judicial activism, by removing the question from 
Congress before Congress could consider it.  In doing so, the Court has realized the 
very fears the Sosa court had warned of—that ATS litigation implicates serious 
separation of powers concerns.186  The majority justified this act on their part by 
stating that the passing of the TVPA did enough to help petitioners with like 
claims.187  However, the TVPA is not helpful to petitioners’ claims at hand, as it is 
limited in applicability and facially rejects any liability for anyone other than 
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“individual” persons.188  Thus, the TVPA is not another valid route by which 
petitioners can bring their claims against Arab Bank as a corporation.  The Court 
claimed that the passing of the TVPA was Congress’s way of stating that these sorts 
of suits should be limited to actions against individuals instead of private entities 
like corporations.189 
However, Congress’s passing of the TVPA cannot be considered a negation of the 
ATS—the TVPA is quite literally a codified note tacked onto the ATS, and merely 
provides a route for two very specific causes of action.  The Court used the wording 
of the TVPA mainly to argue that the ATS applies only to “individuals” instead of 
corporations, but the Court appeared hesitant to argue that the actual limitations 
set within the TVPA also controls the meaning of the ATS.  If Congress supposedly 
meant to narrow the entire scope of the ATS with the TVPA, then this also implies 
that the only violations of the law of nations allowed under the ATS would be 
torture and extrajudicial killing,190 (against only individuals) as was present in 
Filartiga.191  However, Sosa demonstrated that many other crimes should be 
considered as being violative of norms, including crimes like genocide, summary 
execution, and possibly also the funding of terrorist organizations.192  The Court 
should not be able to state that the TVPA demonstrates Congress’s intentions 
wholeheartedly, while also picking and choosing which portions of the TVPA should 
apply to the Court’s understanding of the ATS.193 
The question previously left untouched in Kiobel II have now been answered too 
narrowly.  The circuit split demonstrates that the issue of whether the ATS extends 
liability to corporations is highly divisive.194  Such a narrow rule excluding all 
corporations from consideration is unfavorable, as it precludes any future 
discussion of cases such as the one the Jesner petitioners had brought.   
Congressional silence is not to be taken as a non-answer.  To the contrary, silence 
in itself can be an exact answer, because “where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, 
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”195  Additionally, as the dissent noted, “Congress 
has also never seen it necessary to immunize corporations from ATS liability even 
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though corporations have been named as defendants in ATS suits for years.”196  If it 
was truly such a concern for both foreign and American corporations, it should not 
be doubted that the legislation would give due attention to the issue.  The ATS has 
been used repeatedly in various fields of law in an attempt to bring corporations to 
justice,197 and until Congress says it cannot be used for that purpose, the Court 
should not nullify its use. 
CONCLUSION 
In Jesner, the Supreme Court held that the ATS will not impose liability on corporate 
entities, even when the employees of such entities may have committed horrific 
crimes against humanity; that is, crimes that are looked down upon by the law of 
nations.198  This decision is a regressive step for the nation’s highest Court and it has 
inadequately justified its decision on the grounds of preserving international 
relations.  The ATS itself does not provide any specificity as to who may be 
considered under the term “alien,” and any further interpretation of this term has 
been foreclosed by this Court, unless Congress issues a clarification of the said term.  
The Court failed to provide a valid argument to support excluding all corporations 
from liability when such entities and their human agents have engaged in such 
violations of the law of nations.  The Supreme Court should have interpreted the 
ATS to include corporations and left it to Congress to clarify otherwise. 
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